




C H I N A A E R O S P A C E
S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

Military-Civil Fusion Terminology: A Reference Guide



A BluePath Labs Report by
ALEX STONE

Military-Civil Fusion Terminology: A Reference Guide

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Introduction

This paper is intended as a reference guide for the group of terms frequently used in Chinese official discourse to describe the practice of civil military integration and civil military relations in China.ⁱ Although military-civil fusion (MCF) was elevated to a national strategy under Xi Jinping, each generation of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has promoted a version of this idea, giving rise to the following group of related or overlapping terms.

军民	<i>junmin</i> ⁱⁱ	军民两用	<i>junmin liangyong</i>	以军为主	<i>yi jun wei zhu</i>
军政	<i>junzheng</i>	平战结合	<i>ping zhan jiehe</i>	军品优先	<i>junpin youxian</i>
军地	<i>jundi</i>	以民养军	<i>yi min yang jun</i>	军民团结	<i>junmin tuanjie</i>
军民融合	<i>junmin ronghe</i>	寓军于民	<i>yu jun yu min</i>	军爱民	<i>jun ai min</i>
军民结合	<i>junmin jiehe</i>	民参军	<i>min can jun</i>	民拥军	<i>min yong jun</i>
军民兼顾	<i>junmin jiangū</i>	军转民	<i>jun zhuan min</i>	双拥	<i>shuangyong</i>

Translating these phrases into English is not a straightforward process; a brief explanation of the two primary reasons for this difficulty, as well as some basic explanation about the terms' formation are provided in Section 1. Section 2 identifies each term's origin, common English translations, as well as their meaning in Chinese political, military, and economic contexts.ⁱⁱⁱ

ⁱ This excludes a group of terms used by some scholars in describing other nation's models of civil-military integration. Care should be taken not to accidentally conflate them with descriptions of China's own model. For details see Alex Stone and Peter Wood, "China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy—A View from Chinese Strategists," China Aerospace Studies Institute, June 15, 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/CASI_China_Military_Civil_Fusion_Strategy.pdf, 39-40.


ⁱⁱ There are a number of different standards for using the pinyin Romanization of Chinese with some organizations, such as the Library of Congress, preferring a separation of each individual syllable. See <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/pinyin/romcover.html>. But in Chinese pinyin, structures of two or three syllables that indicate a complete concept are usually linked with no space in between. For some terms referenced in this paper, such as *junmin* [军民] the question if the two characters together indicate a complete concept is a matter up for debate. However, since the bulk of the English literature on this subject link the two characters together, this paper will adopt the same approach for *junmin* for consistency purposes. In other cases (such as *yi min yang jun*) when functional words such as prepositions are involved, the characters are separated for clarity.

ⁱⁱⁱ Section 2 of this paper groups terms by category rather than chronological order. For a detailed overview of the evolutionary arc of some of these terms and how each generation of Chinese leaders viewed the relationship between security and economic development, see Tai Ming Cheung, *Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013); Tai Ming Cheung and Eric Hagt, "China's Efforts in Civil-Military Integration, Its Impact on the Development of China's Acquisition System, and Implications for the United States," in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/63022>; and Stone and Wood, "China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy," 20-27.

Section 1: Linguistic Features of Chinese Political and Military Terminology

There are two primary reasons why these terms are difficult to understand or translate. First, while these terms resemble everyday vocabulary, they are, in fact, specialized terms reflecting complex political ideas, concepts, and theories that are context-dependent. They are often referenced using the term “fangzhen” (guiding principle [方针]), which derives its meaning from the compass, with the connotation of giving direction and guiding actions.

These terms are compact in form, similar to a slogan or a tagline, making them easy to remember and disseminate, but they rarely have official definitions, as they are difficult to clearly define without discussing the theories underpinning these ideas. The general public can usually understand the message a specific term conveys, but the term’s precise meaning, absent an official account, is usually studied and propagated by authoritative theorists and strategists, and scholars and people in that particular field in question. Non-native speakers are not alone in having difficulty understanding and distinguishing these concepts; Chinese scholars have raised this as an issue as well.¹ In fact, several of these terms, such as *yi min yang jun* and *yu jun yu min* are so similar that even writings from authoritative sources occasionally use them incorrectly.



Second, even if outside observers are willing to settle for a literal translation, some linguistic features of the Chinese language make finding exact equivalents in English difficult. A single Chinese character, which almost always corresponds to a single syllable, is also a morpheme, the smallest meaningful linguistic unit in a language. In other words, many characters have lexical meanings on their own and can function as different parts of speech (as either nouns or adjectives, for example). Characters are used to form compounds, which extend, specify, or alter the original meanings further. When characters are used to form political terminologies, they bring with them not just the meanings of the characters, but also the meanings of their associated compounds.

This creates problems when attempting to convert them to their nearest English equivalents. A good example of the difficulty encountered with these terms can be seen in determining a translation of *He Chang Jianbei* [核常兼备], which is part of the service strategy of PLA Rocket Force. Translated literally, it means “having both nuclear (*he*) and conventional (*chang*),” but the phrase does not specify what *he* and *chang* stand for. Furthermore, both characters can be formed into compounds whose meanings extend to nuclear and conventional weapons, nuclear and conventional forces, nuclear and conventional capabilities, and so on. Therefore, in the absence of precise official definitions, this phrase can be applied to all of the following situations, creating critical uncertainties in our understanding of China’s nuclear strategies and deterrence theories:

- Having both nuclear and conventional capabilities.
- Having both nuclear and conventional weapons in separate locations.
- Conducting both nuclear and conventional operations.
- Having a single type of missile with interchangeable nuclear and conventional warheads.

Jun and Min

The group of terms used in discussions regarding MCF have similar issues. Two characters, *jun* [军] and *min* [民], roughly “military and civilian,” act as the basic building blocks for much of the relevant vocabulary. The characters are mixed and matched with other characters and words to form iterative, self-referencing multi-character phrases whose general message can be readily understood by the populace while at the same time remaining ambiguous and open to interpretation.

MCF terms are formed primarily in two ways:

Formula 1: *jun* + *min* + verb/adjective (balance/integrate/fuse/unite...)

Formula 2: Preposition/Verb (by means of/embedding...) + *jun/min* + preposition (for/in...) + *jun/min*

In classical as well as modern Chinese, both the Chinese characters *jun* and *min* have several meanings and can function as nouns or adjectives. Both characters are also used to form compounds. The table below shows the meaning of *jun* and *min* as individual characters, as well as the meanings of the common compounds they form. When *jun* and *min* appear together in a phrase, the meaning is informed both by the individual characters and their meaning as a compound. This feature allows *jun* and *min* to take on fairly broad connotations when they are used to form phrases. According to the *National Defense Economics Dictionary* [国防经济大辞典], in a phrase containing both *jun* and *min*, *jun* usually refers to things related to the military (i.e., military products, the defense industry, armed forces, and national defense construction in general), while *min* denotes the broad idea of “non-military” (civilian products, civilian science and technology industries, civilian enterprises and institutions, and sometimes the national economy).²

Jun, Min, and their Common Compounds ^{iv}			
军 jun	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The armed forces - A large military unit - Used generally to refer to an organized collective 	民 min	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The basic members of society, mainly the working masses - Refers to people or groups of people - Of the working masses, unofficial - People engaged in different occupations - Non-military - People of a certain ethnic group - People in different occupations
军队 jundui	The military; troops	民间 minjian	Nongovernmental
军方 junfang	The military (side)	民众 minzhong	The masses
军人 junren	Military (personnel)	平民 pingmin	Civilian
军事 junshi	Military affairs	人民 renmin	People
军品 junpin	Products for military use	民品 minpin	Products for civilian use
军用 junyong	Military-use	民用 minyong	Civilian-use
军工 jungong	Of or related to the defense industry	民用工业 minyong gongye	Civilian/commercial industry
军力 junli	Military strength	民力 minli	Collective resource, strength, and power of the people

^{iv} This list is not exhaustive.

In other words, depending on the context, *jun* and *min* in the MCF family of terms could be referring to various paired concepts, including but not limited to:

- Security and development
- Defense construction and economic construction
- The defense economy and national economy
- Military strength and civilian strength
- The public sector and private sector
- The defense sector and civilian sector
- The defense sector and private sector
- Military technologies/processes and commercial technologies/processes
- Production of defense goods and civilian/commercial goods within the defense sector
- The armed forces and the people

By contrast, the English terms “military” and “civil,” which are often used as equivalents to *jun* and *min*, do not have such broad connotations. In particular, the word “civil,” which can only function as an adjective, does not carry the connotation of “collective resource, strength, and power of the people.” When *jun* and *min* are used to express the simple idea of the “military and non-military,” the English translation of “military-civil” should suffice, but in some other instances, especially when the second formula is used, a degree of flexibility is needed when translating these terms into English.

There are two additional terms—*junzheng* [军政] and *jundi* [军地]—that are frequently used in discussion about civil-military integration and civil-military relations. In this specific context,^v the term *junzheng* mainly emphasizes the relationship between the military and the government, which can mean the central or local governments. The character *di* in the term *jundi* is mainly used to emphasize the concept of locality, which includes local government units, enterprises, and individuals [地方单位、企业和个人].³ Therefore, *jundi* highlights the relationship between the military and local entities.

Given these complexities, a literal translation or even free translation of terms and phrases of this nature is insufficient to capture the full nuance. The political theories and historical context behind each term are crucial to understanding the meaning of the term as it exists for its intended audience: the Chinese government, military and broader public. With this in mind the following section provides the origin of these terms, the dates of their peak usage as a strategic concept, as well as a brief description of their meaning in a historical context in addition to the terms’ commonly used semantic translations.

^v The term *Junzheng* can also be used to refer to “military-political,” an example of this usage being “military-political training” [*junzheng xunlian*/军政训练].

Section 2: The ‘Family’ of MCF Terms

Having covered the basics of how relevant Chinese political terminologies are created and their underlying associations, this section examines the most widely used terms related to military-civil fusion individually.

Based on the context they appear in most frequently, these terms fall into three broad categories: strategic concepts, the defense industry, and civil-military relations. Terms are grouped by category rather than in alphabetical order. It is worth noting that the translation and explanation for each term only applies to discussion about China. Chinese authors are more rigorous in their usage when applying these terms to describe policy in China, but less so when describing CMI practices in other countries.

Notably, most of these terms were coined around the time of the PRC’s establishment in 1949, and have subsequently acquired new connotations under successive leaders. This context is necessary as phrases dating to the beginning of the PRC have sometimes come to be associated with much later leaders. Terms such as *junmin jiehe* and *yu jun yu min*, which are often described as the hallmark policy initiatives of Deng Xiaoping in the 1970-80s and Jiang Zemin in the 1990s-early 2000s, were part of the guiding principles [方针] for national defense industries going back to the 1950s. These policy guidelines include, most notably, a 16-character policy issued by the Second Ministry of Machine Building of the State Council in 1957^{vi} and a 24-character policy proposed by PLA Lieutenant General [中将] Wang Zheng [王诤], director of the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, in 1963.^{vii}

Category 1: Strategic Concepts

Terms in this category have been elevated to the level of strategic concepts, and in general are used to describe the relationship between security and development, or between the defense economy and the national economy, though they are sometimes used in other contexts. Because terms in this category fit into a historical arc, they are arranged roughly by when their usage in official discourse peaked.

^{vi} The Second Ministry of Machine Building’s 16-character policy [方针] for national defense industries from 1957 lays out the policy of “civil-military integration [*junmin jiehe*/军民结合], combining peacetime and wartime preparations [*ping zhan jiehe*/平战结合], giving precedence to the production of military products [*yijun weizhu*/以军为主], and letting the civilian sector support the military sector [*yi min yang jun*/以民养军].” See “NIDS China Security Report 2021,” National Institute for Defense Studies, November 2020, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2021_A01.pdf, 63.

^{vii} In 1963, Wang, a radio communication expert who had served as a deputy chief of staff of the PLA and a member of the Central Military Commission, was made the director of the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building [第四机械工业部], which specialized in the electronics industry. While Director, Wang put forward a 24-character guideline for the development of China’s defense industry: “Combine peacetime and wartime preparations, prioritize wartime [*ping zhan jiehe, yi zhan wei zhu*/平战结合，以战为主]; combining military and civilian production activities, prioritize the military aspect [*junmin jiehe, yi jun wei zhu*/军民结合，以军为主]; locate military potential in civilian capabilities, let civilian activities support defense construction [*yu jun yu min, yi min yang jun*/寓军于民，以民养军].” See “The Story of the Old General Wang Zheng Stirs up a Learning Tide in the PLA” [老将军王诤的故事激起军中学习潮], People’s Daily, 22 June 2014, <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/0622/c85037-25182469-2.html>.

Junmin jiangou

Chinese	军民兼顾
Romanization	junmin jiangou
Common and suggested translation(s)	- “giving consideration to both the army and the people” ⁴ - balancing the development of public and private economies
In use since	1940s
Peak Usage as a Strategic Concept	1940s-1960s/Mao Eras

Meaning in Historical Context

In 1942 Mao Zedong used the term *junmin jiangou* as a guiding principle for economic activities in the CCP controlled areas in order to ensure sustained sources of revenue and support the Red Army’s operational needs.⁵ Although he had articulated various theories underpinning this concept throughout the 1930s. Notably, when Mao elaborated on the theory behind this term, he equated the *junmin* concept with the “public-private” relationship. Mao said, “In terms of public-private relations, the guiding principle is ‘public-private balance,’ or, ‘military-people balance.’ We believe that only such a slogan is the right slogan. Only by developing the public and private economies in a practical manner can we sustain sources of revenue. Even during difficult times, we still have to pay attention to the limits of taxation, so that although the burden is heavy, the people are not hurt. And once we have a solution, we must reduce the burden of the people, so as to restore the people’s strength.”⁶

In a separate article published in the same year, Mao explained that the ‘public’ aspect covers the economic activities of the military, Party, and government organs, while the ‘private’ aspect refers to the economic activities of the people.⁷ He underscored the importance of protecting the people’s economic interests. In Mao’s own words, “While we take from the people, we have to make the people’s economy grow.”⁸

Academy of Military Sciences analyst Jiang Ying [江英] argues that the strategic concept of military-civil fusion can be traced back to *junmin jiangou*.⁹ Most contemporary usage of this term in official discourse appears to be in reference to Mao’s use of the term. Outside of official discourse, some writings adopt the term’s literal meaning to describe any practices that involve both military and civil spheres.

Junmin jiehe

Chinese	军民结合
Romanization	junmin jiehe
Common translations	- “combine the military and civilian activities/sectors” ¹⁰ - military-civil integration/civil-military integration
In use since	1950s
Peak Usage as a Strategic Concept	1980s/Deng Eras

Meaning in Historical Context

While this term rose to prominence in the Deng era, it had been part of the CCP defense economics lexicon since the 1950s. Senior CCP leaders including Zhu De [朱德] and Zhou Enlai [周恩来] both emphasized *junmin jiehe* as a guiding principle in the construction of the defense and national economy.¹¹

During both the Mao and the Deng eras, *junmin jiehe* was associated most often with two pairs of concepts: the defense economy and national economy and the production of defense goods and civilian or commercial goods within the defense sector. According to MCF strategist Jiang Luming [姜鲁鸣], *junmin jiehe* called for the integration of the national defense industries and the civilian industries, as well as the integration of the manufacture of military and civilian products within the national defense science and technology industry as a general strategic requirement [战略要求].¹²

Over time, the term became widely used to express the notion of “civil-military integration” in the broadest sense. According to the *National Defense Economics Dictionary*, *junmin jiehe* refers to the organic combination of the basic function (military function) and the derived function (economic function) of the national defense economy, so that it can contribute to the modernization of national defense and the construction of the national economy, and become an important pillar for strengthening the national defense force and comprehensive national power.¹³

Yu jun yu min

Chinese	寓军于民
Romanization	yu jun yu min
Common translation	“locating military potential in civilian capabilities” ¹⁴
In use since	1960s
Peak Usage as a Strategic Concept	Early 2000s/Jiang Eras

Meaning in Historical Context

While *yu jun yu min* was part of the 24-character guideline for the defense industry proposed by General Wang Zheng in 1963, the term later came to be associated with a key strategic concept espoused by Jiang Zeming. According to Jiang, *yu jun yu min* was an important measure to organically unite the two strategic tasks of economic development and national defense construction. Jiang emphasized that economic development took priority over defense construction and that defense construction needs could be better served by an increase in national wealth.¹⁵

However, *yu jun yu min* is one of least-well-defined in the family of terms related to MCF. In this case, it makes the most sense to interpret the *jun* and *min* as meaning military and civilian strength (*junli* [军力] and *minli* [民力]) as outlined in Section 1. Interestingly, the idea of embedding military strength in civilian capabilities strongly echoes the science and technology policy of the Clinton administration, which placed emphasis on long-term economic growth, the development of dual-use technologies, a reorientation of military R&D efforts, and the promotion of commercial technological innovations.

Some of the envisioned features that would define the *yu jun yu min* system include high levels of compatibility between the national economy and the defense economy and between military and civilian technologies, active participation from the commercial sector, the ability to leverage S&T achievements and emerging industries, and a strong capacity to transition between peacetime and wartime operations.^{viii16} Notably, Jiang Zemin’s interpretation of *jun* also expanded beyond the defense industry. His plan included initiatives to derive military strength from the civilian sector in areas such as infrastructure, logistics, military personnel education, and defense mobilization.¹⁷

In a sense, the term’s inherent lack of precision allowed Jiang to simultaneously echo guidance from revolutionary leaders, stay true to Deng’s legacy of favoring economic development, while at the same time, begin to slowly tip the balance back in favor of emphasis on defense to prepare China for an entirely new form of warfare.

^{viii} In his book *Fortifying China*, Tai Ming Cheung examined the *yu jun yu min* system in detail, noting that *yu jun yu min* mandates “the forging of an integrated dual-use system, especially the establishment of a civilian apparatus that has the technological and industrial capabilities to meet the needs of the PLA and defense economy” and that a central focus of this tenet was on “configuring the civilian economy for dual-use functions without disrupting economic growth.” See Tai Ming Cheung, *Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy*, 183-190.

Junmin ronghe

Chinese	军民融合
Romanization	junmin ronghe
Common translation	military-civil fusion
In use since	2000s
Peak Usage as a Strategic Concept	2010s/Hu and Xi Eras

Meaning in Historical Context:

After Hu Jintao assumed office in 2003, he proposed pursuing a military-civil fusion-style development path with Chinese characteristics, marking a shift in terminology from *jiehe* [combination/结合] to *ronghe* [fusion/融合] to denote integration with a wider scope and at a deeper level. Xi Jinping has since gone further, raising *junmin ronghe* to the status of a national strategy. MCF strategists often liken *jiehe* to a simple mechanical interaction of parts coming together, while *ronghe* is described as chemical or nuclear reaction. Xiang Qiao [向巧], deputy general manager of Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) and Academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering has explained the difference between the two terms, noting “*jiehe* merely means a mechanical merger, a physical combination, and the resulting force from the interaction is simply superimposed, while *ronghe* represents an organic fusion, a chemical reaction, and the combined force that results can be infinitely great depending on the type of chemical reaction.”¹⁸

Junmin ronghe also uses the broadest possible connotations of the characters *jun* and *min*. According to MCF strategist Jiang Luming, *jun* covers every aspect of the effort to improve national defense and the armed forces, including national defense technology, industry, facilities, mobilization, education, resources, as well as the major operational domains.¹⁹ *Min* refers to fields in the economic and social system that are closely related to national defense and force-building, such as the national science and technology and industrial system, the national talent education and training system, the national social services system, the national emergency management system, as well as emerging domains and nascent technological areas such as maritime, space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence that are closely linked to the generation of new combat capabilities.

Taken together, the more expansive interpretation of *junmin* captures the cross-sector nature and ambitious scale of the MCF strategy, while the powerful connotations of *ronghe* reflects the strategy’s important goal of forging synergies.

Junmin yitihua

Chinese	军民一体化
Romanization	junmin yitihua
Common translations	- unification of military-civil efforts, capacity, etc. - civil-military integration (CMI) (U.S.)
In use since	1990s
Peak Usage as a Strategic Concept	2010s/Xi Era

Junmin yitihua is a context-dependent phrase. First, and most importantly, the phrase has been used by Xi Jinping in official discourse to describe the ultimate goal of the MCF strategy: the gradual build-up of China’s “unified military-civil system of strategies and strategic capability” [军民一体化的战略体系和能力].

However, at the same time, this term has also been frequently associated with the U.S. model of civil-military integration (CMI).²⁰ A report published in 1994 by the former U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) titled *Assessing the Potential for Civil-Military Integration* was well known in the MCF research community in China and prominent scholars often use *junmin yitihua* to describe CMI practices in the United States. However, as mentioned earlier, CMI practices in other nations are labeled according to personal preferences rather than following a universal standard.

Category 2: Defense Industry

Terms in the second category appear most frequently in discussions about the defense industry. Here *jun* and *min* are often used to describe three paired concepts: 1) defense sector and civilian/private/commercial sector; 2) production of defense goods and civilian/commercial goods within the defense sector; 3) military technologies/processes and commercial technologies/processes.

Junmin liangyong

Chinese	军民两用
Romanization	junmin liangyong
Common translation	“dual-use” ^{ix}
In use since	1950s

The concept of “dual use” entered widespread use in the West beginning in the 1980s largely due to concerns over technology transfer and arms proliferation. The Chinese term *junmin liangyong*, which seems like a ready equivalent, was in fact coined in the 1950s to guide defense production activities and in that historical context, deals more with an allocation of resources to the production of defense goods and civilian goods within the defense sector than concerns over diffusion of military technologies.

After the end of the Korean War, a consensus emerged among the CCP leadership that another world war was not imminent, and that China’s defense expenditures, which accounted for 30 percent of the total budget between 1953 and 1958, should be reduced to 20 percent to divert more resources to economic development.²¹ To make the transition between defense and civilian production easier Mao Zedong encouraged the defense industries “to build dual-use production lines, to master two sets of production skills on two sets of equipment.”²²

Through the evolution of China’s economy, the meaning and usage of this term has evolved accordingly to have converged with its western counterpart, appearing frequently in discussions about technologies, processes, and products designed for both military and non-military purposes.

^{ix} For example, the term is used in the name of a trade magazine published by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and is translated as “dual use.” See <http://jmllycp.ckan.cn/>.

Ping zhan jiehe

Chinese	平战结合
Romanization	ping zhan jiehe
Common translation	combining peacetime and wartime preparations ²³
In use since	1950s

The term *ping zhan jiehe* emphasizes the mindset of preparedness for war even during peacetime, constant balancing and adjustment of efforts in and between the military and the civilian spheres, as well as the ability to transition between the two states quickly and smoothly. In addition to wartime mobilization and surge capacity building, it also calls for utilization of wartime assets for economic development purposes. For example, according to the Suzhou Civil Defense Bureau, *ping zhan jiehe* dictates that civil air defense facilities can be put to civilian use in peacetime, creating social and economic benefits, on the condition they not negatively impact civil defense response.²⁴

The term originated in the 1950s as part of a broader guidance issued by Senior CCP leaders such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai in the construction of the defense and national economy.²⁵ While the term is still used in discussions about the defense industry, it appears most frequently in literature related to the building of a combined civilian and military mobilization system that includes civil air defense, defense mobilization, and public emergency preparedness. For example, the term was widely used during the COVID-19 pandemic to describe government-military-civilian coordinated responses.

Yi jun wei zhu & Junpin youxian

The following two phrases, *yi jun wei zhu* and *junpin youxian*, are historically connected: *yi jun wei zhu* was part of a policy guideline for the national defense industry in the Mao Era which was later replaced with *junpin youxian* by Deng Xiaoping in 1982.²⁶

Mao Era: “Junmin jiehe, ping zhan jiehe, yi jun wei zhu, yi min yang jun.”

[军民结合，平战结合，以军为主，以民养军]

Deng Era: “Junmin jiehe, ping zhan jiehe, junpin youxian, yi min yang jun.”

[军民结合，平战结合，军品优先，以民养军]

Yi jun wei zhu

Chinese	以军为主
Romanization	yi jun wei zhu
Common translation	“give precedence to the military” ²⁷
Suggested translation	give precedence to the production of products for military use
Peak usage between	1950s-1980s

Junpin youxian

Chinese	军品优先
Romanization	junpin youxian
Common translation	“give priority to military products” ²⁸
Suggested translation	guarantee production of state-mandated defense models while devoting more resources to producing civilian goods
In use since	1980s

These two terms are especially tricky to translate as their literal meanings are fairly similar: “giving precedence to” or “to prioritize” the production of products for military use. Therefore, it is vital to consider the historical circumstances surrounding their origin. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping and his strategists made the judgment that “peace and development are the themes of today’s era, and large-scale wars cannot be waged in a short time.”²⁹ Based on this judgment, the Party refocused its attention on economic development. On June 4, 1985, at an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission Deng pointed out: “The four modernizations require prioritization. Military equipment modernization is only possible in earnest if the national economy has established a relatively good foundation. Therefore, we (the military) must stay patient for a few years.”³⁰ Deng’s decision to change part of the policy was to reflect this fundamental change in priority, which dictated where resources should be allocated.

Huai Guomo [怀国模], former deputy director of the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), explained this shift in priority: “*Yi jun wei zhu* requires that the defense industry devote itself to the production of military products; if half or more of its capacity is used for civilian product output, then it runs counter to the principle. On the other hand, *junpin youxian* requires that, despite devoting fewer resources to defense products,

they are still given priority, and production of state-mandated defense models must be guaranteed [国家确定的军品任务严格给予优先保证].”³¹

Both terms attempt to clarify the responsibilities and obligations of defense enterprises and the types of products they should produce. The *yi jun wei zhu* mandate indicated that the majority of the products should serve defense needs, while *junpin youxian* signaled to the defense enterprises that their capacity to produce certain key defense products and systems should not be diminished as they pivot to production of civilian products.

Yi min yang jun

Chinese	以民养军
Romanization	yi min yang jun
Common translation	- “letting the civilian sector support the military sector” ³² - “use civilian sales to foster military R&D” ³³
In use since	1960s

Initially a part of Lieutenant General Wang Zheng’s 24-character policy guideline proposed in the 1960s, *yi min yang jun* received renewed emphasis after Deng Xiaoping assumed power. In remarks given in 1978, Deng used this guideline to stipulate that defense industries should devote at least half of their capacity to the production of civilian goods, increasing that number to two-thirds after automation became widespread.³⁴ Further, Deng added that there were numerous benefits and no negative consequences in promoting the full engagement of the defense industrial base, its integration into the national economy, and the vigorous development of civilian and commercial products.³⁵ Following Deng’s guidance to pivot, defense industries were asked to use civilian sales to support military R&D and some defense research academies saw a two-thirds cut in its R&D appropriation for 1985.³⁶

In his analysis of the Deng era policies, MCF strategist Jiang Luming notes that the logic behind this term is that the high technology achievements made by military enterprises through the development of civilian and commercial products can be used for the development and production of military products, eventually forming a virtuous cycle that stimulates the production of both military and civilian products.³⁷

Most contemporary use of this term in official discourse appears to be in reference to Deng’s use of the term. Outside of official discourse, some analysts adopt the term to describe civil-military integration practices in Japan.

Jun zhuan min

Chinese	军转民
Romanization	jun zhuan min
Common translations	- military-to-civilian conversion - “spin off” ³⁸ - “eliminating barriers to defense conversion” ³⁹
In use since	1980s

Jun zhuan min was part of Deng Xiaoping’s policy initiative in the 1980s to integrate the defense industrial base into the national economy by making available its equipment, technological expertise, and human resources.

Speaking to reporters in 2004, former COSTIND Deputy Director Huai Guomo explains that *jun zhuan min* is an internationally well-known practice which refers to the conversion of military facilities to civilian use, and the conversion of military production capacity to the production of civilian products.⁴⁰ Under Deng, the defense industry invested more than 3 billion yuan and built 475 production lines for civilian purposes in the 1980s.⁴¹ Many companies that began as part of the defense industry thrived in the commercial sector and went on to become household names, including Jialing motorcycle, Changan automobile, Changhong TV, among others.⁴² Beginning in 1988, national defense technology patents began to be declassified and made available for commercial applications.

Jun zhuan min can be used to refer to the conversion of various types of military and defense assets (including facilities, technologies, equipment, etc.) for civilian purposes, as well as the commercialization of defense technology achievements. It therefore conveys both the ideas of “spin-off” and “conversion.”

Min can jun

Chinese	民参军
Romanization	min can jun
Common translation	- “civilian participation in the defense industries” ⁴³ - “opening up China’s defense market to private sector firms” ⁴⁴ - “Participation of civilian or commercial entities in defense projects” ⁴⁵
In use since	2005

While *min can jun* and *jun zhuan min* often appear as a pair, the idea of *min can jun* only became prominent after the release of a 2005 State Council regulatory document officially announcing support for the development of non-public economies [非公有制经济].⁴⁶ Article 6 of the document removed previous barriers to entry for non-public (private) capital [非公有资本] into the defense S&T market, dictating that enterprises in the non-public sector of the economy be allowed to compete for defense research, development, and manufacturing contracts, as well as participating in the restructuring of state-owned defense industrial corporations according to the relevant provisions.^x Enterprises in the non-public sector of the economy were also encouraged to take part in the development of advanced dual-use technologies and their commercialization.⁴⁷

Due to the heavy emphasis the policy directive placed on non-public sector/capital, the “min” in *min can jun* is best understood as “private” rather than “civilian.” In other words, the policy was intended to encourage the participation of private, non-government-owned or operated entities into the defense market. This distinction is important, because it helps to exclude China’s state-owned defense corporations—which are, technically speaking, civilian entities—from the discussion.^{xi}

Yu Zonglin [于宗林], another former deputy director of COSTIND, highlighted the three main channels for entrance into the national defense market:⁴⁸

1. Participation in the development and production of military products (prototypes), or participation in the development and production of parts and components.
2. Participation in the ownership reform of state-owned defense corporations, or forming new joint ventures.
3. Participation through the labor market. For example, the employment of S&T and management talent in (state-owned) defense corporations.

^x Although companies with a military background or receive strong Party, state, and military backings had been able to circumvent these legal barriers in the 1990s. For example, as Tai Ming Cheung’s research suggests, due to the former military background of its management, Huawei Technologies became a telecommunications supply to the PLA despite its status as a nongovernment company. See Tai Ming Cheung, *Fortifying China*, 216.

^{xi} These groups are owned by the State-Owned Assets and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) [国务院国有资产监督管理委员会], but SASTIND (under MIIT) is in charge of overseeing their business operations. These defense groups also maintain military procurement relationships with the CMC Equipment Development Department and service equipment procurement bureaus.

Category 3: Civil-Military Relations

The third category of terms focuses on civil-military relations. Here *jun* and *min* are often used to describe the paired concept of the armed forces and the people.

Junmin tuanjie^{xii}

Chinese	军民团结
Romanization	junmin tuanjie
Common translation	unity/solidarity between the PLA and the people
In use since	1930s

In 1937, Mao Zedong formalized the three basic principles of political work of the red army: “unity of officers and soldiers; unity of the army and the people; and the disintegration of enemy forces [官兵一致、军民一致、瓦解敌军].”⁴⁹ When it comes to “unity of the army and the people,” Mao explains: “it is a discipline which forbids the slightest violation of the people’s interests. [The army] educates, organizes, and arms the people and relieves their burdens, attacking traitors who endanger the people and the army. This way, the army and the people are closely united [军民团结一致] and [the army] is welcomed by the people everywhere.”⁵⁰ On 1 August (PLA Day) 1963, Mao ended a poem he composed with the emphatic statement “If the army and the people are united as one, who in the world can oppose?” [军民团结如一人，试看天下谁能敌], which Xi Jinping referenced at an award ceremony in 2016, calling it “an unbreakable truth.”⁵¹

Junmin tuanjie often appears simultaneously with *junzheng*^{xiii} to highlight the three pillars of civil-military relations: the military, the people, and the government. For example, section 14 of the Central Committee’s *Recommendations for the 14th Five-Year Plan* (FYP) called for strengthening *junzheng junmin tuanjie* (unity between the PLA and central government and local governments, as well as unity between the PLA and the people).⁵² According to Jiang Luming, *junzheng junmin tuanjie* provides political support for MCF development. He writes, “*junzheng junmin tuanjie* is a unique political advantage of our military, and the rock-solid military-political (governmental)-civilian relationship is an important asset for us to overcome all hardships and dangers and continue to move from victory to victory.”⁵³

^{xii} In late October 2020 the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee released its *Recommendations for the 14th Five-Year Plan* (FYP) and longer-term policy goals through 2035, which served as a teaser for China’s policy priorities for the next five years and beyond. Perhaps due to the significant attention the MCF has garnered from senior U.S. leaders and policy community, the *Recommendations* for the 14th FYP chose to employ more cryptic language to outline the strategy’s next steps. It stripped explicit references to MCF and instead chose to highlight the idea of *junmin tuanjie*, harkening back to Mao’s early writings on civil-military relations. See “Recommendations for formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035” [中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议], Xinhua, 3 November 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-11/03/c_1126693293.htm.

^{xiii} See page 8 for details.

Jun ai min, min yong jun (shuangyong)

Chinese	军爱民、民拥军(双拥)
Romanization	jun ai min, min yong jun (shuangyong)
Common translation	“the army loves the people; the people support the army”
In use since	1940s

Jun ai min, min yong jun as an idea and a practice dates back to the 1940s and included two key aspects: *yong jun you shu* [拥军优属] and *yong zheng ai min* [拥政爱民].⁵⁴ The term *yong jun you shu* is an abbreviation meaning “supporting and loving the PLA and giving preferential treatment to and caring for military families.” *Yong zheng ai min* asks the PLA to support the government and love the people, as part of its outreach efforts to strengthen civil-military relations.

Activities which promoted these concepts are often referred to as “shuangyong work” [double support/双拥工作], a term coined for the simple fact that both *yong jun you shu* and *yong zheng ai min* begin with the character *yong*. Since taking office, Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of “shuangyong work” on multiple occasions. For example, at a ceremony awarding shuangyong model cities (counties) held in July 2016, Xi said: “The greatest power is the concentric force. Under the new situation, “shuangyong work” can only be strengthened, not weakened. With the combined efforts of the military and the people, we will be able to achieve the Two Centennial goals (development targets set for 2021 and 2049) and realize the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and create a better future together.”⁵⁵

According to local government agencies charged with promoting “shuangyong work,” under the “new situation,” the idea has been further enriched to include additional aspects, including national defense education for all, supporting military recruitment work, assisting with military operational and training tasks, protecting military facilities, caring for active-duty as well as demobilized military personnel and their families, among others.⁵⁶

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